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THE CASE OF ANGELINA v. EUCLID: A STUDY
IN PROCEDURAL ENTANGLEMENTS *
MAURIE FINKELSTEIN t

Mr. Justice Holmes, "is the best of
law reformers." I He was, of course, referring to the fact
that often in the past the simplification of legal procedure
grew out of the inability of lawyers to master its complexities.
But even under our very much heralded simplified procedure
there is ample room for lawyers to be caught in a procedural
labyrinth from which at times the only escape is to sacrifice
2
the cause. So let it be with the case of Angelina v. Euclid.
To the people who were parties to this cause, as well as
to all non-lawyers who knew about it, it must have seemed
very odd that so much could happen which involved so little.
For here was a case in which the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant owed him some $35,000.00, and yet some two years
and nine months after the suit was started the cause wasto borrow a World War I phrase-spurlos versenkt, and it
never was ascertained whether the plaintiff really had a claim
against the defendant, or had merely dreamed it up.
During the course of this proceeding no less than thirtytwo motions were made by one party or the other; four appeals were taken to two Departments of the Appellate DiviIGNORANCE," remarked

* This is the third in a series of case histories designed to study the actual
process of litigation through the courts. The first one was published mb noinine,
The Case of the Beverly Hotel-A Study of the Judicial Process,27 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 261 (1953) ; the second sub nomine, The Case of the Broker's Commission, 28 ST. JoHN's L. Rav. 220 (1954).
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 78 (1881).
2 306 N.Y. 606, 115 N.E.2d 831 (1953), affirming 280 App. Div. 405, 113
N.Y.S.2d 537, and also 280 App. Div. 918, 115 N.Y.S.2d 921 (1st Dep't 1952),
which in turn affirmed two determinations at Special Term by Justice Rabin,
127 N.Y.L.J. 1746, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. May 1, 1952), and 128 N.Y.L.J. 22, col. 4
(Sup. Ct. July 3, 1952), and a decision by Justice Corcoran, 127 N.Y.L.J. 1079,
col. 4 (Sup. Ct. March 18, 1952).
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sion, and one to the Court of Appeals. More than thirty-seven
judicial decisions were made with respect to the problems

raised by these motions and appeals.3 On a very small branch
of the case, there was even a full dress trial before a court
and jury, which resulted in a directed verdict for the plaintiff
in the sum of $210.00, on motion made by the defendants
after the close of the trial.
This miniature Jarndyce case arose out of events which
occurred in April, 1950. The defendant, Euclid, was then

about to obtain a contract to build additions to a hospital
in Brooklyn. The project was an elaborate and costly one,
and the defendant engaged the services of the plaintiff to
supervise the masonry work involved in the construction.
To this end, a contract in writing was entered into between

Euclid and the plaintiff, wherein the duties and rights of the
parties were extensively set forth. This agreement was prepared by defendant's lawyer and throughout the plaintiff
claimed to have signed the contract without reading it, and
that it did not contain the real agreement he had negotiated
with the defendant. Yet it was the only written document
in the case.

3 The number of judges who participated in these decisions was, perhaps,
somewhat larger. In the Court of Appeals there were two judicial determinations. In one of them seven judges participated and in the other six judges
participated. Four appeals were taken to the Appellate Division and five motions were made of which only two were reported officially. As five justices
participated in each of these judicial determinations, there were forty-five individual judgments involved. But, of course, some of the justices acted more
than once. The various appellate reports can be found in: 306 N.Y. 606, 115
N.E.2d 831 (1953); 305 N.Y. 557, 111 N.E.2d 435 (1953); 281 App. Div. 659,
117 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1st Dep't 1952); 280 App. Div. 918, 115 N.Y.S.2d 921
(1st Dep't 1952); 280 App. Div. 890, 115 N.Y.S.2d 523 (lst Dep't 1952);
280 App. Div. 405, 113 N.Y.S.2d 537 (1st Dep't 1952); 279 App. Div. 789,
110 N.Y.S.2d 183 (lst Dep't 1952); 279 App. Div. 594, 107 N.Y.S.2d 237
(2d Dep't 1951). These do not include three determinations by the Appellate
Division, not reported officially: (1) Order granting motion for a stay of trial
pending an appeal from Justice Corcoran's order dismissing the fourth cause
of action. 127 N.Y.L.J. 1934, col. 6 (App. Div. 1st Dep't May 14, 1952);
(2) Order of Appellate Division denying appellant's motion to consolidate two
appeals. 127 N.Y.L.J. 2117, col. 3 (App. Div. 1st Dep't May 27, 1952);
(3) Order conditionally denying respondent's motion to dismiss appeal from
Justice Frank's order. 129 N.Y.L.J. 2131, col. 5 (App. Div. 1st Dep't June 26,
1953).
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The written agreement, in addition to the usual provisions contained some harsh provisions. Inter alia, it
provided:
1. That the plaintiff was to receive $150.00 per week
as a fixed stipend.
2. In addition, plaintiff was to receive as additional
compensation, one-half of the amount by which the cost of the
masonry work fell below $158,000.00.
3. The plaintiff was to be bound by a certificate issued
by defendant's accountant as to any figures or accounting.
4. Plaintiff was never to have right to examine defendant's books or records.
5. Plaintiff could be dismissed at any time by defendant
if his work was, in the opinion of defendant, unsatisfactory.
6. If plaintiff was dismissed or if he was incapacitated,
he would lose his rights to any portion of his additional compensation, provided for in "2" above.
Some time in April, 1950, the plaintiff entered upon his
duties. So far no serious disputes as to the facts appear.
But from this point, the parties give widely different versions
of what happened. The plaintiff claimed that he performed
his work in a workmanlike and expert manner and the defendant, on the other hand, asserted that plaintiff's work was
from the beginning slipshod, careless, and completely unsatisfactory, and that plaintiff was warned from time to time
that he was not living up to his contract. Since these issues,
basic to a valuation of the justice of the cause, were never
tried out, the truth is unknown. But it is a fact that on
January 16, 1951, plaintiff was dismissed by the defendant
on the alleged ground that his work was unsatisfactory.
Except for 210.00, the plaintiff's fixed stipend of $150.00
per week had been fully paid. But no part of the additional
compensation referred to in the written contract was ever
paid to the plaintiff, and the defendant denied any obligation
to make such payment.
Under the express terms of the written agreement, the
plaintiff would seem to have had no claim against the defen-
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dant, except for the sum of $210.00. But the plaintiff did
not feel he was bound by the written agreement. It was, in
the first place, prepared by defendant's attorney; the plaintiff claimed that he had signed it without reading it; plaintiff
alleged that his signature to the contract was obtained by
fraud; and plaintiff also alleged the written contract was
quite different in its terms from that which the parties had
agreed upon. Moreover, the plaintiff averred that he was
dismissed, not because his work was unsatisfactory, as defendant stated, but because it became apparent that a large sum
would be due to the plaintiff for additional compensation,
and that only by dismissing the plaintiff could the defendant
keep for itself this large sum and thus be unjustly enriched.
Throughout this long litigation, which is hereinafter described in detail, not one of these claims, thus asserted by
the plaintiff, was ever passed upon. Instead, a vast forest of
legal problems-mostly of a very technical procedural variety
-luxuriantly grew into a huge record. And in the end, the
entire cause, as we earlier stated, vanished.
The proceedings were initiated by two separate steps.
The first was the filing on March 2, 1951, by the plaintiff, of
a mechanic's lien against the property under construction, in
Kings County, in the sum of $77,000.00. The second step
was the issuance by the plaintiff on March 5, 1951, of a summons and complaint against the Euclid corporation and its
president in an action at law in New York County, demanding damages.
It will, perhaps, simplify matters if the vicissitudes of
the mechanic's lien proceeding are first followed, at least
until that proceeding merged with the proceeding in New
York County, in May, 1952.
The plaintiff voluntarily cancelled the mechanic's lien
for *77,000.00 and in its place filed a new one for only
34,000.00. In order to release the real property from the
burden of the lien, the defendant filed a bond by a duly accredited bonding company. At this point, the plaintiff was
willing to permit the mechanic's lien to lie fallow and to
press for a trial before a court and jury in New York County.
The defendant, however, in no mood for a jury trial, sought
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to litigate the issues in Kings County in the mechanic's lien
proceeding. 4 But in this effort the defendant failed.
The first step taken by the defendant in Kings County
was to serve a notice pursuant to the lien law requiring
Angelina, the plaintiff, to commence foreclosure of his mechanic's lien within thirty days. This notice is provided for
in Section 59 of the Lien Law which states that the notice
shall require the lienor to commence an action to foreclose
the lien ". .. or show cause at a special term of a court of
record, . .. at a time and place specified therein, why the

notice of lien filed or the bond given should not be vacated
and cancelled ....

," 5

The first quite futile legal battle took place over this
notice. The plaintiff, not having commenced a suit in foreclosure, the defendant moved at Special Term to vacate the
lien or to cancel the bond which had been filed in lieu thereof.
The application was bottomed on an affidavit made by the
president of the defendant corporation which stated simply
that (1) a lien had been filed, (2) that a notice pursuant to
Section 59 of the Lien Law had been served on the lienor,
and (3) that no action to enforce the lien had been commenced within the thirty-day period provided in the notice.
In opposition to this motion, the attorney for the plaintiff
filed an affidavit which made three points: (1) that the action pending in New York County was sufficient compliance
with Section 59 of the Lien Law; (2) that the application
could not be granted because the lien had been bonded;
(3) that the owner of the real property had not been made
party to the motion. On oral argument, at Special Term,
before Mr. Justice Baar, the plaintiff relied on two cases:
(1) Drake Construetionr Corp. v. Kenn Equipment Co.,6
which held a notice was defective if it did not in terms require the lienor to show cause at Special Term at a time
and place specified therein, why the lien should not be vacated; and (2) on Uris v. The Brackett Realty Co., 7 which
4An action to foreclose a mechanic's lien is a proceeding in equity, hence
triable by a court without a jury.
5N.Y. LIEN LAW § 59.

6274 App. Div. 809, 79 N.Y.S.2d 747 (2d Dep't 1948).
7 114 App. Div. 29, 99 N.Y. Supp. 642 (1st Dep't 1906).
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held that Section 59 did not apply to a case where the lien
had been bonded. The defendant's counsel answered both
cases. The Drake Construction case was distinguished on the
ground (somewhat specious) that the notice in that case was
fatally defective, whereas here the plaintiff had had both his
notice and his application to vacate; that the mere fact that
the direction to show cause was not contained in the notice
was, therefore, a mere technicality. The Uris case was obviously not in point. It was decided in 1906 when the statute
did not extend to bonded liens. In 1929, the statute had been
amended to extend its provisions to bonded liens.8
On this record the motion was granted and the lien and
the bond given in lieu thereof were directed to be cancelled.
Justice Baar disposed of all the plaintiff's points as follows: I
In re Euclid Concrete Corp'n (Angelina)-This is an application by
a contractor for an order discharging a mechanic's lien filed by Louis
Angelina, a subcontractor, against Beth-El Hospital, Inc., as owner
of property in the County of Kings and against Euclid Concrete Corporation, as contractor. After the filing of the lien in Kings County
the contractor served on the subcontractor lienor a notice pursuant
to section 59 of the Lien Law, demanding that he commence an action to enforce the lien within thirty days from the date of service of
the notice. The contractor bonded the lien and filed an undertaking
in support thereof. The lienor took no action in Kings County to
enforce the lien and the contractor brought on the within application
to vacate the lien. Contrary to the lienor's contention, section 59 of
the Lien Law applies regardless of whether the mechanic's lien on
real property has been bonded or otherwise. The case of Uris v.
Brackett Realty Company (114 App. Div., 29), which appears to
limit an application to vacate a lien solely to an unbonded lien was
decided before the enactment of the present provisions of section 59
of the Lien Law, which specifically provides for the vacating and
canceling of a bond given to discharge a lien. The subcontractor has
an action pending in New York County against the contractor herein
based on breach of contract arising out of the same transactions which
are the basis for the filing of the lien herein; it is not an action to
foreclose the lien on real property in Kings County. Furthermore,
the foreclosure of a lien must be litigated in the county in which the
s Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 515, § 37.

9 126 N.Y.L.J. 181, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 1, 1951).
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real estate against which the lien has been filed is located. Since the
subcontractor has elected to start an action in New York County to
enforce his rights which had arisen out of the transactions which
constitute the basis for the filing of the mechanic's lien in Kings
County, he may not bring another action on the same facts in Kings
County to enforce the lien herein. While the thirty-day notice served
on the lienor by the contractor does not in so many words require
that the lienor show cause why the notice of lien should not be vacated, that lack is supplied by the within notice of motion. No adequate explanation has been given for the failure to institute the action
to foreclose the lien. The motion to vacate and cancel the mechanic's
lien and the undertaking thereafter furnished in connection with same
is granted. Settle order on notice.
The plaintiff promptly appealed. In the Appellate Division, the plaintiff abandoned the Uris case, but relied strongly
on the Drake case. The big point was that the notice to foreclose the lien was defective in that it failed to require the
plaintiff to show cause at a specified time and place why the
lien should not be vacated for failure to foreclose. The Appellate Division followed the Drake case, reversed Justice
Baar, and granted permission to the defendant to proceed
anew on a proper notice. The court said: 10
In the Matter of Euclid Concrete Corp., Respondent. Louis Angelina,
Appellant.-Appeal by the lienor from an order which granted an application to vacate and cancel a mechanic's lien and an undertaking
furnished in connection therewith, and to discharge the surety thereunder, for failure to commence an action to foreclose the lien. Order
reversed on the law, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the application denied, without costs and without prejudice to the making
of a new application for the same relief on proper notice. The notice
served by respondent failed to comply substantially with the requirements of section 59 of the Lien Law. It failed to require the lienor
to commence an action to enforce the lien, within a time specified in
the notice, not less than thirty days from the time of service of the
notice and to require the lienor to show cause at Special Term at a
time and place specified therein, why the notice of lien should not be
vacated. (Matter of Drake Constr. Corp. [Kenn Equipment Co.],
274 App. Div. 809).

10 279 App. Div. 594, 107 N.Y.S.2d 237 (2d Dep't 1951).
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Accordingly, the defendant served a new notice to compel foreclosure of the lien. This time the notice was correctly
drawn and complied meticulously with the requirements of
Section 59 of the Lien Law.
But the struggle to bring the mechanic's lien before the
bar of the court was not yet over. Instead, the attorney for
the plaintiff allowed the thirty-day period to expire and
moved the court for an extension of time to serve a complaint.
The motion was first denied because the papers in its support
did not contain an affidavit of merits. But on the reargument, Mr. Justice Keogh granted the motion:"
Angelina v. Beth-El Hospital, Inc.-In an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien plaintiff seeks permission to serve the complaint, although
his statutory time so to do has expired for the reason that illness of
his attorney had prevented the drawing and serving of said complaint.
Although defendants' attorney strongly opposes such relief, he indicated that he would consent to such on condition that plaintiff post
security because of defendants' possible recovery on a counterclaim.
Under the facts and circumstances and mindful of the interests of all
parties and attorneys in the action, the court, in its discretion, grants
the motion; complaint to be served on or before January 21, 1952; no
security to be posted. Settle order on notice.
Thus a total of nine months and nine days was required
to elapse between the filing of the mechanic's lien and the
service of the complaint in foreclosure.
At long last, on January 18, 1952, the complaint in the
action to foreclose the mechanic's lien was served. The complaint required some analysis. In the first place, it took no
notice of the fact that the lien had been bonded. In the
second place, it described the contract between Angelina and
Euclid in terms that did not at all resemble the written agreement. The claim was generally made that plaintiff and
Euclid had entered into an agreement to share profits on the
masonry work, that plaintiff had fully performed, that plaintiff's share of the profits was about $3,000.00 and a demand
was made for a strict foreclosure of the lien to enable the
plaintiff to recover the amount due him. The answer served
11127 N.Y.LJ. 13, col. 1 (Sup. Ct Jan. 2, 1952).
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by the defendant denied the essential allegations of the complaint; set forth the written contract between the parties;
and pleaded two counterclaims. Then followed a brief struggle for a bill of particulars, 1 2 which, when it arrived, contained the allegation that the plaintiff's cause of action was
based on an alleged oral contract, although a written contract
between the parties was extant. The defendant thereupon
noticed the case for trial. But the trial was delayed as the
plaintiff, on February 26, 1952, amended his complaint. The
amended complaint did not alter plaintiff's theory of his
cause, but took into account the fact that the lien had been
bonded and asked for judgment against the Maryland Casualty Co., upon whom also a supplemental summons was
served.
The action was now ripe for trial. All that remained
was the difficulty of being reached on the equity calendar in
Kings County. Long, long afterward, in October of 1953, it
became apparent during an argument in the Court of Appeals
that the action to foreclose the mechanic's lien, based as it
was on a count to recover damages for breach of contract,
did not lie. 13 Probably, therefore, the action in Kings County
could have been dismissed on motion. But the defendant,
eager for a trial without a jury in Kings County, did not
make such a motion.
But there was to be no trial in Kings County, although
the case appeared on the Reserve Calendar on March 24, 1952.
The court was tied up with other causes, the plaintiff was
not ready, the New York County action was being pressed.
In addition, as will be hereinafter related, a cause of action
identical with the one pending in Kings County, was dismissed by Mr. Justice Rabin in the New York County case.
Inasmuch as plaintiff had appealed Justice Rabin's decision
12 The dispute about this bill of particulars was a nominal one. A demand
was made for the bill. But no bill was served pursuant to the demand. A
formal motion was then made for a bill. In the meantime, the plaintiff had
amended his complaint and argued that the items sought in the motion for the
bill were not applicable to the amended complaint. But as the amendment to
the complaint was not substantial, Justice Murphy directed a bill to be served
(127 N.Y.L.J. 855, col. 5 [Sup. Ct. March 3, 1952]), and it was timely served.
13 This is a well settled point of law. See BLANc, MECHANIcS' LIENS 88, 89
(1949) and cases there cited.
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rendered on May 1, 1952, the court agreed to a protracted
postponement of the Kings County action.
Finally, the entire proceeding in Kings County disappeared when Mr. Justice Cohalan, on May 6, 1952, granted
plaintiff's motion to consolidate the Kings County action
with the New York County action. One year and two months
had passed and nothing had been decided. The log of these
proceedings in Kings County as set forth in the lawyers'
records is impressive for its bulk, but devastating in its
implications of procedural futility. It is instructive to
reproduce it:
March

April

2, 1951.
7, 1951.

Mechanic's lien filed for $77,530.05.
A demand for an itemized statement
Lien Law served
pursuant to Section 38
14
by Euclid on lienor.

15, 1951.

Plaintiff voluntarily cancels mechanic's
lien for $77,530.05.

9, 1951.

Plaintiff files new mechanic's lien for
$34,320.35.
Defendant serves notice on lienor to
compel enforcement of lien pursuant to
Section 59 of Lien Law.
Ri parte order signed fixing amount of
bond to be filed to release lien at
$36,500.00.
Notice to plaintiff of application to ap-

12, 1951.

21, 1951.

May

3, 1951.

prove bond.

August

16, 1951.

Notice of motion to vacate lien for failure to prosecute pursuant to notice.

1, 1951.

Decision by Justice Baar vacating lien
and cancelling bond.

14 Laws of N.Y. 1929, c. 515, § 38, as amended, Laws of N.Y. 1930, c. 859,

§ 19. The notice of lien merely gives totals of materials furnished and labor

performed. Hence, this section enables the lienee to obtain details in advance
of the trial.
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October

16, 1951.

Appellate Division in Second Department grants stay of Justice Baar's
order.

9, 1951.

Appellate Division in Second Department reverses order of Justice Baar vacating lien.
Served new notice to compel enforcement of mechanic's lien.
Served motion to compel lienor to furnish statement of labor and materials.

23, 1951.
23, 1951.
November 2, 1951.

26, 1951.
28, 1951.
December 4, 1951.
21, 1951.
24, 1951.

January

[ VOL. 29

Justice Nova grants motion to compel
lienor to serve statement of labor and
materials.
Lienor serves summons in action to
foreclose mechanic's lien.
Lienor serves verified statement with
respect to labor and materials.
Defendant serves notice of appearance
and demand.
Motion for extension of time to serve
complaint.
Motion to extend time to serve complaint heard by Mr. Justice Keogh and
plaintiff directed to serve complaint by
December 27, 1951.

2, 1952. On reargument, plaintiff permitted to
serve complaint by January 21, 1952.
18, 1952. Plaintiff serves complaint.

February 4, 1952.
18, 1952.

Answer served.
Action noticed for trial by defendant
for March term.
19, 1952. Motion by defendant for bill of particulars.
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26, 1952.

Supplemental summons and amended
complaint served.

3, 1952.

Justice Murphy grants in part motion
for bill of particulars.

17, 1952.

Answer served on behalf of Maryland

Casualty Co.
24, 1952.

Action is called on reserve calendar.

31, 1952. Received plaintiff's bill of particulars.
April

8, 1952.

Received plaintiff's reply.

8, 1952.

Plaintiff moves to dismiss first affirma-

tive defense and counterclaim.
30, 1952. Justice Cohen grants motion to dismiss
defendant's first affirmative defense and

counterclaim.
May

6, 192.

Order consolidating Kings County case
into New York County cause granted by
Justice Cohalan.

In the meantime, while all this futility was going on in
Kings County, a much more complicated series of events was
taking place in New York County. But to understand this
we must go back and study the action in New York County.
The first complaint served in the New York County action was amended as of right. But the complaint thus
amended was in part dismissed on motion of the defendants
pursuant to Rule 106 of the Rules of Civil Practice. 15 As

'5 125 N.Y.L.J. 1705, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. May 9, 1951).
Justice Breitel (then
sitting in Special Term) wrote as follows:
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corp'n-Motion by defendant to dismiss the
second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action in the complaint under
R.C.P. 106 for legal insufficiency is denied as to the third [fourth] and
fourth [fifth] causes of action, the motion having been withdrawn with
respect thereto, and granted as to the second and third causes of action
with leave to the plaintiff to serve a further amended complaint within ten
days after service of the order herein, with notice of entry thereof.
"The second cause of action is deficient. In considering this cause of action the court is limited to scanning its allegations and may not make
reference to any writing not incorporated therein directly or by reference.
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the issues thus early raised on this motion were ultimately
dispositive of the entire case, it will serve to describe the
amended complaint and the problems it raised in some detail.
This amended complaint contained five causes of action.
Of these the first, fourth and fifth were legally unobjectionable. The first cause of action sought merely to recover
$210.00 for unpaid but earned wages; the fourth and fifth
causes of action sought to recover several thousand dollars
for rent for the use by the defendants of certain tools and a
motor truck which were alleged to have been owned by the
plaintiff.
But the second and third causes of action were vigorously challenged by the defendants on the ground that they
were legally insufficient. The second cause of action was
held to be defective because it joined a cause of action for
quantum meruit with a cause of action for a breach of contract in the same count; the third cause of action was held
to be premature and deficient in that it failed to connect the
damages alleged to have been suffered with the fraud alleged
to have been committed. 16 The dismissal of the second and
Completion of the main contract is not alleged. Nor is any resulting profit
as defined alleged to have occurred, nor for that matter neither the actual
final cost of the masonry work or the amount received from the hospital.
The paragraph numbered third of the complaint refers to difference between actual cost and 'contract price or sums obtained therefor.' The
cause of action may not be considered in quantum meruit since it expressly
pleads and makes demand pursuant to the alleged expressed contract.
"The third cause of action is likewise deficient. The injury alleged to
have been sustained as a result of the charges of fraud is the execution
of a written agreement and that event is never properly related to the
sums of money claimed to be the amount of damages. Again, too, the
allegations of final cost of the work and receipt by defendant corporation
of the main contract price and the extras are omitted, although this time
the complaint in paragraph numbered eleventh refers to the amount the
defendant corporation 'was to receive for the masonry work,' rather than
as above quoted from paragraph numbered third.
"The test of the pleading's weakness is that the masonry may never have
been completed, so far as the allegations are concerned, and defendant
corporation may not have been paid for the work. Under the first circumstance the final cost of the work may not yet be ascertainable. Under the
second circumstance no profit as defined has accrued under the second
cause of action. In neither connection may the court construe the written
agreement, attached as an exhibit but intentionally not incorporated directly or by reference to supply the pleading omissions. Order signed."
(Bracketed words supplied by court in republication.)
16 Ibid.
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third causes of action of the amended complaint led to a new
complaint which divided the second cause of action into two
counts, one in quantuni meruit (the new second cause of action), and the other for breach of contract (the new third
cause of action) ; and the third cause of action which became
in the second amended complaint the fourth, was essentially
left unchanged.
At this point, the defendants began what might be
termed the struggle for the bill of particulars. The steps
taken illustrate the cumbrous procedure made necessary by
the rules-a procedure which steadily worsened the plight
of the plaintiff and heightened the difficulty under which he
labored in his effort to get a hearing on the merits.
First:

An order of the court was secured by the defendants directing plaintiff to serve a bill of particulars on the attorneys for the defendants. This
order directed the plaintiff to state whether or not
the contract alleged in the third cause of action
was oral or in writing and also to itemize the particulars of the fraud alleged in the fourth cause of
action and the damages alleged to have been suffered thereby. 17

Second: The bill of particulars not having arrived on time,
a motion was made to preclude the plaintiff from
giving testimony at the trial with respect to the
items in the complaint concerning which the particulars had been demanded.
Third:

The bill of particulars arrived before the return
day of the Wotion, but because it was not satisfactory to the attorney for the defendants, the motion
to preclude was pressed..

17 126 N.Y.L.J. 3, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. July 2, 1951), per Mr. Justice Schreib'er,
who wrote the following brief memo:
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corp'n-Motion is granted to the extent of
eliminating items 8, 12 and 14 from the demand and otherwise denied.
Let a bill accordingly be served within thirty days from the service of a
copy of this order, with notice of entry."
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Fourth: The court found that the bill of particulars was insufficient in some respects, and afforded the plaintiff an opportunity to serve a further bill.'8
Fifth:

The plaintiff served a further bill of particulars
and the defendants' attorney found this new bill
also deficient, at least in so far as the fourth cause
of action was concerned.

Sixth:

The defendants then moved again to preclude and
the court erroneously granted a blanket order precluding the plaintiff from giving any testimony at
the trial. 19

Seventh: The plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Division,
while holding the bill inadequate, nevertheless, afforded the plaintiff a further opportunity to serve
a still further bill of particulars.2 0
Eighth: The plaintiff served a new bill of particulars, but
inasmuch as the new bill was thought to suffer
from the same defects as the old one, a new motion
to preclude was made by the defendants; but this
time the motion was denied.2
18 Justice Rabin in 126 N.Y.L.J. 669, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 28, 1951),
wrote:

"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corp'n-Motion to preclude is granted unless
plaintiff serves a further bill of particulars as to items 3, 9 and 10 within
five days after service of a copy of this order, together with notice of
entry thereof."
19 Justice Walter in 126 N.Y.L.J. 1307, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 20, 1951),

wrote:

"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corp'n-Motion to preclude is granted. The
bill served sets forth the total damages claimed but does not state the
items thereof as required by the order."
20279 App. Div. 789, 110 N.Y.S.2d 183 (1st Dep't 1952).
It was there
stated:
"Louis Angelina, Appellant, v. Euclid Concrete Corp. et al., Respondents.Order unanimously modified by limiting the preclusion of plaintiff to evidence of the alleged damage in the sum of $34,320.35 set forth in paragraph 20 of the complaint unless, within ten days after service of a copy
of the order to be entered herein, with notice of entry thereof, plaintiff
shall serve a supplemental bill of particulars setting forth in detail how it
is claimed that said amount of damage arose and, as so modified, affirmed,
with $20 costs and disbursements to the appellant. Settle order on notice."
21Justice Dineen in 127 N.Y.L.J. 1724, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. April 30, 1952),

wrote as follows:
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corporation-Motion by defendant to pre-
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The issues involved in this struggle for a bill of particulars concerned largely the fourth cause of action. In that
cause of action the plaintiff sought to recover damages for
alleged fraud practiced upon him by the defendants, Euclid
Concrete Corp. and its president. It was alleged generally
that in order to induce the plaintiff to sign the written agreement of April 6, 1950, the defendants represented to the
plaintiff that the agreement between the defendants and the
hospital involved an allowance for masonry work of approximately $158,000, and that the job would require 200,000 face
brick and 40,000 common brick. It was further alleged that
the defendants fraudulently represented that the plaintiff
would receive 50% of the amount by which the total final
cost of masonry work was exceeded by the sum that Euclid
was to receive for the said masonry work from the hospital.
It was then alleged that as a matter of fact the signed agreement of April 6, 1950, did not contain the terms orally agreed
upon between the parties and that the job, in fact, required
242,000 face brick and 100,000 common brick, and that Euclid
had actually contracted to receive $213,000 for the masonry
work rather than 158,000 as had originally been misrepresented. For these misrepresentations which induced the signing of the contract by the plaintiff, as here alleged, the plaintiff demanded damages in the sum of V5,000.
In the request for a bill of particulars the defendants
demanded as follows: "State what are the items of damage
resulting from the alleged fraud as alleged in paragraph
'Twentieth' of the plaintiff's second amended' complaint."
The response to this demand, which was ordered by the court,
was contained in a bill of particulars as Item 10 thereof and
read as follows:
The damages arising from the said fraud are claimed in the alternative,
so that if the plaintiff is prevented from recovering on the causes of
action other than the acts of action for fraud set forth in his com-

clude plaintiff from giving any testimony with regard to matters set forth
in paragraph 'Twentieth' is denied. The bill served in accordance with
the order of the Appellate Division is a substantial compliance therewith."
In view of the subsequent history of this fourth cause of action, the opinion
of the court on this application can only be ascribed to judicial ennui.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 29

plaint by reason of the terms and conditions of the writing dated
April 5, 1950, which writing the plaintiff was fraudulently induced
to execute, then and in that event he will have been damaged to the
extent that he is prevented from recovering on the acts of action in
question. In the event that the plaintiff has been, or will be prevented, by reason of his having executed the said writing, from proving his first cause of action, he shall have been damaged in the sum
of $210. In the event that the plaintiff is prevented from proving
his second cause of action by reason of his having executed the said
writing, he shall have been damaged in the sum of $34,320.35. In
the event that the plaintiff has been, or will be prevented from proving his third cause of action by reason of the execution of the aforesaid document, then the plaintiff has been damaged in the sum of
$34,320.35. In the event that the plaintiff is prevented from proving
his fifth cause of action by reason of his having executed the said
document, then he shall have been damaged in the sum of $600. In
the event that the plaintiff is prevented from proving his sixth cause
of action, then he shall have been damaged in the sum of $2,385,
all by reason of the fraudulent statements.
This allegation of damage, as indicated above, did not
satisfy the defendants and resulted in the order to preclude
made by Mr. Justice Walter, mentioned above, which was
modified in the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division,
however, in modifying the order, directed the service of a
bill of particulars with respect to the damages for fraud and,
pursuant thereto, the plaintiff served a further bill of particulars. The new bill of particulars, in alleging the damages
suffered for fraud, stated as follows:
Upon information and belief, the defendant Euclid Concrete Corp. received the sum of $213,876 plus the cost of extras amounting to the
sum of $4,764.71 making a total sum of $218,640.71 from the Beth-El
Hospital for masonry work done (see Exhibit A of plaintiff's bill of
particulars, dated August 27, 1951). Upon information and belief
the cost to the Euclid Concrete Corp. of all the masonry work already
done, together with additional costs, it would have incurred had the
plaintiff been permitted to continue his contract to its completion by
the said defendant corporation, would have been approximately
$150,000. The difference between the two sums is $64,640.70, onehalf of the said sum is $32,320.35. The said amount is what the
plaintiff is seeking to recover under the other causes of action in his
complaint, and it has been previously stated in the bill of particulars
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served heretofore that the cause of action for fraud is stated in the
alternative.
The defendants again moved to preclude and this time
the motion to preclude was ultimately denied by Mr. Justice
22
Dineen.
The defendants, however, were still of the opinion that
neither the complaint in its fourth cause of action nor the
three bills of particulars, which were served with respect

thereto, set forth adequately any damages which could be recovered in an action for fraud and accordingly the defendants
moved to dismiss the second, third and fourth causes of ac-

tion on the grounds that they did not state facts sufficient
to constitute causes of action.

The motion came on to be

heard before Mr. Justice Corcoran and while the second and
third causes of action were allowed to stand, the fourth cause

of action was dismissed.
of it, said as follows: 23

The learned Justice, in disposing

22 Ibid. A similar bit of procedural futility surrounded the various applications for examinations before trial. Plaintiff procured an order to examine
defendants before trial. (See opinion of Justice Nathan, 126 N.Y.L.J. 403,
col. 5 [Sup. Ct. Sept. 7, 1951] as expanded on reargument, 126 N.Y.L.J. 1131,
col. 6 [Sup. Ct. Nov. 5, 1951].) Defendant then sought to examine plaintiff
before trial and also sought to inspect plaintiff's books and records. These
applications are provided for in § 296 of the Civil Practice Act and Rule 140
of the Rules of Civil Practice. This application was countered by the plaintiff
by a cross-motion to inspect defendant's books. The motion and cross-motion
were disposed of by Justice Hofstadter as follows (127 N.Y.L.J. 244, col. 3
[Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1952]):
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corporation-Motion for examination before
trial is granted. The plaintiff will appear for examination five days after
completion of the examination of the defendant and signing of the same.
Pertinent books, records and documents are to be produced for use pursuant to section 296, C.P.A. That branch of the motion and the crossmotion for a discovery and inspection is denied, without prejudice to a
renewal of motion after completion of the examinations and the showing
of the necessity at that time for the relief sought"
This opinion did not tend to speed things up. The examinations of both plaintiff and defendant proceeded and revealed but few facts of importance. At one
point defendant refused to go on with the examination and plaintiff promptly
moved to strike out defendant's answer. Whatever the right or wrong of it,
Justice Levey refused to strike out the answer and ordered the examination
to proceed. 126 N.Y.L.J. 1707, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 19, 1951):
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corp'n-Motion to strike out the answer is
denied upon condition that the examination is continued at Special Term,
Part II, of this court, on December 26, 1951, at 11 A.M,'
23 127 N.Y.L.J. 1079, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. March 18, 1952).
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The fourth cause of action is dismissed. It is substantially the same
as the cause of action which was in the previous complaint as the
third cause of action and which was dismissed on motion. I certainly have no intention of passing upon the decision of another justice in dismissing this cause. It is enough to warrant dismissal that
the plaintiff, although granted leave to amend, did not amend to correct the defects pointed out in the decision dismissing the cause.
Paragraph twentieth which is the only new allegation in this cause
of action, as amended, adds nothing to it. In effect, it alleges that
the plaintiff has suffered no damage as result of the alleged fraud but
might suffer damages "in the event" certain contingencies occur.
This decision of Mr. Justice Corcoran was appealed to
the Appellate Division by the plaintiff and the decision of
Justice Corcoran was upheld by a divided court, Mr. Justice
Dore writing a dissenting opinion. The majority summarized
the allegations of fraud in the fourth cause of action and the
damages alleged therein as follows:

24

Following the allegations of fraud leading to plaintiff's inducement
to sign the written agreement, as pleaded in the fourth cause, it is
alleged that "in the event the plaintiff is held by any Court of competent jurisdiction to be bound by and to" the written contract, he
will be damaged in the sum of $35,000.
This is merely saying that if a court holds the agreement good plaintiff will be damaged by its terms. But if the contract is a good contract, in the legal sense, that would be the end of the matter and the
enforcement of the writing according to its terms would not be
actionable.
Parties often sustain damage by their valid contractual undertakings,
but it has never been supposed that damage lies against the other
party to the contracts in consequence of this; and what is a "valid"
contract in the event of controversy is what a court acting with jurisdiction says it is. The theory tendered by the plaintiff is not a
cause for which relief at law exists.
24 280 App. Div. 405, 406, 113 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (1st Dep't 1952).
The
plaintiff sought here to establish his cause of action for fraud by adopting the
contract and seeking to recover damages for the fraud which he claimed had
induced him to sign the agreement. But the mere signing of the contract
caused plaintiff no loss, particularly since loss of profits is not an element of
damages in fraud. Foster v. Di Paolo, 236 N.Y. 132, 140 N.E. 220 (1923).
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Mr. Justice Dore, dissenting,2 5 assimilated the fourth
cause of action to those cases in which it has been held that
while the measure of damages may be improperly pleaded,
the cause of action is not thereby invalidated.
Ultimately, the majority view was upheld in the Court
of Appeals, but a number of procedural maneuvers took place
prior thereto.
The defendant having disposed of the fourth cause of
action and having failed to bring about a dismissal of the
second and third causes of action, now moved at Special
Term for summary judgment. The new motion, as is required, was bottomed not only on the pleadings but also on
an affidavit in support of the motion. The affidavit, after
describing the causes of action in the complaint, set forth the
written agreement of April 5, 1950, which contained a provision that "should Angelina fail to perform the services
hereunder in a manner and at a rate of progress satisfactory
to Euclid, Euclid may terminate its agreement upon three
days written notice to Angelina and in such event Angelina
shall be entitled only to the proportionate salary provided in
subparagraph (a) of Article 3 herein." The affidavit went
on to say that Angelina's work was unsatisfactory to the defendants, and he was accordingly dismissed on three days
notice. Furthermore, the moving papers showed that the
said agreement provided that the parties were to be bound
by the figures certified by a named certified public accountant
and that the accountant had certified that the masonry work
had resulted in a loss to the defendant. It was pointed out
in the moving papers that on either of these two grounds the
second and third causes of action should be dismissed. For
if the plaintiff was removed because his work was unsatisfactory pursuant to the written agreement, he could not recover under the terms of the agreement, 26 and in any event,
25 See Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corp., supra note 24 at 407, 113 N.Y.S.2d
at 539.
20 A provision that an employee may be dismissed if his work is not "satisfactory" to the employer is operative even if the judgment of the employer is
arbitrary, provided he is in fact dissatisfied. Cf. Reiss v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 279 App. Div. 805, 109 N.Y.S.2d 625 (2d Dep't 1952), aff'd, 304 N.Y.
953, 110 N.E2d 888 (1953).
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this being a profit-sharing arrangement, there was nothing
to recover since there was no profit in the transaction. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, in an answering affidavit,
claimed the right to rely on an oral agreement although a
written one existed and had been entered into between the
parties. This alleged oral agreement, of course, did not contain the terms and provisions of the written agreement upon
which the defendants relied. Mr. Justice Rabin heard argument and received briefs on the issues presented by this motion and came to the conclusion that "[n]o triable issue is,
however, presented as to the second and third causes of action and the defendants are entitled to partial summary judgment as asked for in their memorandum of law as to those
causes of action."

27

It was after this motion had been granted that the order
consolidating the action in Kings County with the action in
New York County was made. The defendant opposed the
successful effort made by the plaintiff to consolidate these
causes of action and tendered the proposition to the court
that the consolidation should not take place because a more
speedy trial could be had in Kings County. Reliance was
placed by the defendant on the decision of the Appellate
Division in Tenenbaum v. Dunlop,2 8 in which it was held
that where two actions are pending and all the issues can
be determined more speedily in one than in the other, con21Justice Rabin, in 127 N.Y.L.J. 1746, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. May 1, 1952),
wrote as follows:
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corporation-A triable issue is presented in
respect of the first cause of action in view of the statement in the answering affidavit of plaintiff that he has never been paid the $210 involved
in that cause. The rights of the parties are not sufficiently clear as to the
fifth and sixth causes of action to warrant the granting of summary judgment dismissing the complaint as to those causes. No triable issue is,
however, presented as to the second and third causes of action and the
defendants are entitled to partial summary judgment as asked for in their
memorandum of law as to those causes of action. In view of the dismissal

of the fourth cause of action that cause must be disregarded on the present
motion notwithstanding the fact that the order of dismissal is being appealed from. The motion is granted to the extent of directing summary
judgment in favor of defendants dismissing the secpnd and third causes of
action and directing the severance of the action as to the first, fifth and
sixth causes. In other respects the motion is denied. Settle order."
28200 App. Div. 604, 193 N.Y. Supp. 407 (1st Dep't 1922).
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solidation was not a sound exercise of judicial discretion.
29
Nevertheless, the motion to consolidate was granted.
But inasmuch as summary judgment had been granted
with respect to the principal causes of action in the New
York County case by Mr. Justice Rabin, and inasmuch as
the consolidated action in Kings County involved the very
same issues disposed of by Mr. Justice Rabin, the defendant
moved before Mr. Justice Rabin for an order extending and
modifying Mr. Justice Rabin's prior order so that the same
summary judgment could be rendered with respect to the
Kings County cause of action now consolidated with the New
York County action. In response to this application, the
plaintiff filed an affidavit which did not raise any new issues
of fact but pointed out that the original order granting the
defendants' order for summary judgment in the New York
County case was presently on appeal. Mr. Justice Rabin
disposed of this new motion with a brief opinion as follows: 30
Motion is granted. The prior order dismissing the second and third
causes of action is res adjudicata as to the complaint in the Kings
County action, which has now been consolidated with the New York
County action. No issue of fraud was raised in the complaint in the

Kings action, the claim only being asserted by way of reply to the
counterclaim. This motion is addressed solely to the complaint. The

fact that an appeal is pending from the prior order granting summary
judgment should not act as a bar to the relief now sought. In fact,

it would seem more practical to have the record in such form as will
permit of an appellate determination in both actions on a single ap-

peal. This is particularly so since the question to be reviewed will
be the same in each instance.

The order hereon may provide for a

stay pending application to the Appellate Division on notice for a
further stay.

The two orders granting summary judgment made by
Mr. Justice Rabin, the one disposing of the second and third
causes of action in New York County, and the other disposing of the Kings County action, were heard on appeal together by the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division
affirmed both orders, this time unanimously, but afforded the
29
30

127 N.Y.L.J. 1811, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. May 6, 1952) (Justice Cohalan).
128 N.Y.L.J. 22, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. July 3, 1952).
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plaintiff an opportunity to get a hearing on the merits of his
cause of action, an opportunity which the plaintiff never
seized. The brief opinion of affirmance said as follows: 11
As the pleadings stood on the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff was bound by the written contract and summary judgment on
the causes of action based on the alleged oral contract was properly
granted. We affirm with leave to plaintiff to plead a cause of action
for reformation or rescission.
This disposition of the second and third causes of action
by Mr. Justice Rabin, as well as of the Kings County action,
disposed of them completely subject, of course, to a possible
review in the Court of Appeals. There was left in the case,
however, three causes of action-the first, fifth and sixth.
As has already been indicated, the first cause of action was
for only $210.00, an amount said to be due to the plaintiff
for unpaid wages; the fifth cause of action was to recover
the sum of $600.00, alleged to be due to the plaintiff from the
defendant for the rental of certain tools and equipment
owned by the plaintiff; the sixth cause of action was to recover $2,385.00, alleged to be due to the plaintiff from the
defendant for the rental of a truck owned by the plaintiff.
While these causes of action involved but small amounts,
it was necessary, of course, to dispose of them before the case
could be closed. The defendant, moreover, had interposed
certain counterclaims, and one of these counterclaims had to
do with a claim made by the defendant that the plaintiff had
wilfully exaggerated the amount of his lien and therefore
the defendant was entitled to recover damages for such wilful
exaggeration. Accordingly, the defendant moved in Special
Term for a summary judgment with respect to the said coun31280 App. Div. 918, 115 N.Y.S.2d 921 (lst Dep't 1952). The attorney for
the plaintiff was not unaware of the fact that an oral contract cannot be proved
when a written contract exists and covers the transaction. See Laskey v. Rubel
Corp., 303 N.Y. 69, 71, 100 N.E.2d 140 (1951). But he sought to apply hereto
the familiar rule that a contract obtained by fraud can be disregarded and need
not be reformed as a condition precedent to maintaining an action on the contract as it might be reformed in equity. RESTATEMENT, CONmACrs § 507 (1932).
But this is not intended to override the parol evidence rule and permit the
proof of a contract by parol, wholly different from the written contract. To
accomplish this, one would have to plead and prove fraud in the factum-a
condition not claimed to be present in this case.
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terclaim. The amount claimed in said summary judgment
was something in excess of $38,000 and therefore summary
judgment was requested not only in support of the counterclaim, but also dismissing the remaining causes of action in
the plaintiff's complaint because, obviously, they did not total
the amount requested in the counterclaim.
In supporting this motion for summary judgment the
defendant pointed out that the counterclaim in question was
based on Sections 39 and 39(a) of the Lien Law 32 which, in
effect, provided that if there is a wilful exaggeration of an
amount due to the lienor as set forth in the lien, the lienor is
obligated to pay damages and these damages include the
amount of any premium for a bond given to obtain the discharge of the lien, a reasonable sum for attorney's fees for
services in securing the discharge of the lien, and an amount
equal to the difference by which the amount claimed to be
due under the lien exceeded that found to be due. In the
instant case the amount of the lien was approximately
.$35,000 and it was shown that nothing was due thereunder
since the proceeding was dismissed. Therefore, the entire
amount of the lien claimed was an exaggeration. As to
whether or not the exaggeration of the amount due was wilful, the defendant argued that no such lien should have been
filed in the first place since the cause of action on which it
was based consisted of a cause of action to recover damages
for breach of contract, and this was not a proper subject of
33
a mechanic's lien.
This was a bitterly contested motion and it was met by
the plaintiff with two separate thrusts; one was a crossmotion seeking to strike out and dismiss as insufficient in
law the counterclaims set up in the defendants' answer. The
3

2 N.Y. LIEN LAW § 39 provides that if "[iun any action or proceeding to
enforce a mechanic's lien," the court shall find that the lienor has "wilfully
exaggerated" the amount due on the lien, the lien shall be void. Id. § 39-a
provides that "[w]here in any action or proceeding to enforce a mechanic's
lien" the court has found the lien void because of wilful exaggeration of the
amount due, the owner or contractor may be awarded damages against the
lienor which shall include the bond premium, attorney's fees, plus the amount
by which the lien was exaggerated. It will be noted that both Sections 39 and
39-a require that the exaggeration be wilful and that the finding as to wilfullness be made in the action to foreclose the lien.
33 See note 13 supra.
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second was likewise a cross-motion seeking summary judgment for the plaintiff on the first, fifth and sixth causes of
action. Desperate expedients were resorted to by the parties, consisting of letters to the judge after memoranda had
been filed and after the argument had taken place. It was
at this point that passions seemed to run high in the case.
The defendants struggled to quench the last flickering flame
of hope that the plaintiff had for any recovery.
Mr. Justice Gold heard the defendants' motion and the
plaintiff's cross-motion and finally disposed of them all in
the following opinion: 34
Triable issues are presented as to plaintiff's right to recover on the
first, fifth and sixth causes of action which require denial of his cross
motion for summary judgment upon these causes. Said cross motion
is accordingly denied. The cross motion to dismiss as insufficient
the first and second counterclaims is granted, with leave to serve an
amended answer within ten days from the service of a copy of this
order, with notice of entry. The first counterclaim consists of conclusions with insufficient ultimate facts to support them. The second
counterclaim is insufficient for failure to allege that the court has
found a "wilful" exaggeration of plaintiff's claimed lien as required
by Sec. 39-a of the Lien Law. That section requires a declaration by
the court deciding the foreclosure action that the lien is void "on
account of wilfil exaggeration." No such declaration is pleaded. The
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the second counterclaim
is denied in view of the dismissal of the counterclaim. Furthermore,
summary judgment is not authorized upon a cause of action based
34 128 N.Y.L.J. 249, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 14, 1952).
It will be noted that
the counterclaim was dismissed because Section 39-a requires a declaration "by
the court deciding the foreclosure action" that the exaggeration of the lien was
wilful. Here, however, there could be no such finding, since the action to
foreclose the lien was dismissed for insufficiency. Upon an application for
reargument, defendant's counsel pressed the court to realize that the counterclaim was not defective, inasmuch as it could hardly plead a finding in the
foreclosure suit before the suit was tried. Justice Gold allowed this possibility
-128 N.Y.L.J. 599, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 25, 1952)-but insisted that the
counterclaim was demurrable because it did not in haec verba allege that the
exaggeration was "wilful." He said:
"Angelina v. Euclid Concrete Corporation-Motion for reargument is denied. Even if the second counterclaim need not allege a finding of wilful
exaggeration, it should at least allege that there was in fact, 'wilful' exaggeration of the lien. This is required by section 39-a of the Lien Law.
As the counterclaim does not allege that the exaggeration was wilful, it
is insufficient."
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(Rule 113,

The effort, therefore, to dispose of the defendant's counterclaim and the first, fifth and sixth causes of action in the
plaintiff's complaint failed and the only thing left was to
hold a trial before a jury on the issues. The trial took place
before Mr. Justice Frank and a jury. At the close of the
evidence submitted on both sides, Mr. Justice Frank dismissed the fifth and sixth causes of action. He rendered an
oral opinion from the bench in which he showed that no recovery could be had for rental value of tools and equipment
engaged to do a job
or the truck of an employee who was
35
requiring the use of such equipment.
There was left for disposition the first cause of action
in the New York County case and the defendant's counterclaims in the Kings County action. These counterclaims had
also been interposed in the New York County action and had
there been dismissed, as we have seen, by Justice Gold. The
defendants, therefore, withdrew them at the close of the
trial. But the first cause of action in the New York County
case went to the plaintiff. A judgment in his favor in the
sum of $210 was directed by Justice Frank on motion made
by counsel for defendants.
As soon as the judgment was entered, a new struggle
arose as to the form of the iorder to be entered by Justice
Frank. The plaintiff had caused a judgment to be entered
which in terms disposed of not only the trial before the court,
but also the other causes of action. The judgment which
had been entered covered the entire proceeding. It provided
for judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of $210; it provided
that the defendant have judgment against the plaintiff, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint as to the second, third,
fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action, as well as to the action originally commenced in Kings County.
It will be recalled that the dismissal of the fourth cause
of action by Mr. Justice Corcoran was affirmed by the Appel35 Coates v. Village of Nyack, 127 App. Div. 153, 157, 111 N.Y. Supp. 477,
479-480 (2d Dep't 1908).
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late Division by a divided court. Had a judgment been entered at that point severing the fourth cause of action and
entering judgment thereon in favor of the defendant, an appeal to the Court of Appeals therefrom would have lain as of
right."6 But no such judgment was entered. On the other
hand, the second and third causes of action and the Kings
County case had been dismissed by Mr. Justice Rabin and
his orders had been unanimously affirmed in the Appellate
Division. Had a separate judgment been entered on Justice
Rabin's orders, no appeal therefrom to the Court of Appeals
would lie except by permission. " 7 The plaintiff, by including
the disposition of the fourth cause of action in the judgment
disposing of the entire case after the trial, sought to create
an avenue for an appeal on all the issues in the case to the
Court of Appeals.
The defendant, therefore, moved to modify the judgment
and suggested that there be two judgments--one disposing of
the second, third and fourth causes of action as well as the
Kings County action- and the other disposing of the first,
fifth and sixth causes of action which were subjects of the
trial before Mr. Justice Frank. Again the contest between
the parties was bitter. The attorney for the plaintiff first
opposed the motion being referred to Mr. Justice Frank. Two
letters were addressed to the court by the attorney for the
plaintiff. The attorney for the defendants also addressed a
letter to the court. But all of this maneuvering resulted in
nought because Mr. Justice Frank considered the papers before him insufficient to enable him to make a proper decision.
He wrote as follows: 38
Motion is denied with leave to renew upon full, complete and proper
papers. The contention of plaintiff that the motion should not have
§ 588(1) (b)i.
N.Y. Civ. PPAc. AcT § 589. The plaintiff applied for leave to appeal the

36 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr
37

order of the Appellate Division. But his motion was denied. 280 App. Div.
890, 115 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1st Dep't 1952). The proper procedure would have
been to enter the judgment and appeal as of right. A like motion for leave
to appeal to the Court of Appeals from the order of the Appellate Division
unanimously affirming the orders of Justice Rabin granting defendant's several
motions for summary judgment was also denied.

281 App. Div. 659, 117

N.Y.S.2d 854 (1st Dep't 1952).
38 See 129 N.Y.L.J. 752, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. March 6, 1953).
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been referred to me by Special Term is without merit (Oakley v.
Cokalette, 6 App. Div., 229). The statement (in the moving papers)
that the Appellate Division affirmed with leave to commence an action for rescission is not borne out by the order. of the Appellate
Division. The judgment does not set forth the determination made
by me at Trial Term. In sum, the papers submitted herein on both
sides are inaccurate, inadequate and incomplete.
Attorney for defendants renewed the motion. This time,
for the purpose of avoiding, if possible, a review of the whole
case in the Court of Appeals, the defendants moved that the
judgment be vacated and that three judgments be entered
in lieu thereof. It was suggested that the proper way to dispose of the case was to enter one judgment dismissing the
fourth cause of action and a second judgment granting to
the defendants judgment on the second and third causes of
action and on the Kings County case, and the third judgment
disposing of the matters raised at the trial, to wit: the first,
fifth and sixth causes of action. While these motions were
pending, the defendants, of course, paid the $210 judgment
and made a strenuous effort to persuade the court that justice could be done only by entering three separate judgments.
But Mr. Justice Frank did not concur in this view.
Admitting that the defendants ". . . might have previously
entered separate judgments after orders were entered dismissing the various causes of action on his motions addressed
to the pleadings," 39 he, nevertheless, said that by paying the
judgment on the first cause of action and by accepting a satisfaction piece thereon, the defendants may be deemed to
have waived this right. Moreover, Mr. Justice Frank held
that the plaintiff had lost his right to amend his pleading to
state an action for reformation or rescission because he did
not avail himself of that opportunity when the Appellate
Division afforded it to him.
The judgment, therefore, remained a single one disposing of the entire suit in one judgment. It not only gave the
plaintiff his judgment for $210; it not only dismissed the
defendants' counterclaims, but it also dismissed the plain-

39 See 129 N.Y.L.J. 1191, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. April 10, 1953).
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tiff's second, third, fourth, fifth and sixth causes of action
and the action in Kings County.
From this judgment plaintiff appealed directly to the
Court of Appeals, as of right.
The problem involved in the right to appeal to the Court
of Appeals was raised timely by motion made by defendants
in the Court of Appeals for an order dismissing the appeal
on the ground that the same was not appealable as of right.
As indicated above, the judgment, insofar as it dealt with
the second and third causes of action and the Kings County
action, had been unanimously affirmed in the Appellate Division and was, therefore, not appealable as of right to the
Court of Appeals.4 0 On the other hand, with respect to the
fourth cause of action, the Appellate Division was divided
and therefore, to that extent, the judgment was appealable
to the Court of Appeals as of right. Since both phases of
the case were included in one judgment, the problem was to
determine whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
hear an appeal on the entire judgment merely because the
Appellate Division had divided on one part of it. The defendants argued that it was improper for the court to hear
the appeal on the entire judgment and that, therefore, the
appeal should be dismissed. There was a noticeable lack of
authority although the court was referred to the case of
Adlerblum v. Metropolita? Life Insurance Co.,41 but the
Court of Appeals denied the motion, 42 and at the moment
one would find it difficult to venture a guess as to whether or
not a judgment with respect to several causes of action, one
of which is affirmed by a divided court and the other by a
unanimous court, is entirely appealable as of right.
At long last the matter came before the Court of Appeals
and the whole record was presented to the court and very
elaborate briefs written on both sides. Oral argument lasting nearly two hours was held before the court and six judges
of the Court of Appeals participated. In the end, what was
40 See note 37 supra.

41284 N.Y. 695, 30 N.E.2d 728 (1940).
42305 N.Y. 557, 111 N.E.2d 435 (1953).

1954]

THE CASE OF ANGELINA v. EUCLID

left of the case was a three-line obituary in the Law Journal
reading as follows: 43
Judgment affirmed, with costs. No opinion. All concur except Van
Voorhis, J., taking no part.
This was the end of the entire episode and it occurred
on October 22, 1953, two years and nine months after the
case had been initiated.
Unanswered questions remain. (1) Did the defendant
really defraud the plaintiff? (2) Was it necessary to indulge
in this elaborate procedure? (3) How much of this procrastination and multiplicity of court activity is the fault
of the lawyers in the case? And (4) is there any way in
which a situation of this kind can be disposed of or dealt
with without permitting the procedure to run wild as it did
in this case?
When one returns to fundamentals we can see that very
important principles of natural justice have been here violated. The plaintiff did not have his day in court. His
grievance, real or imaginary, has not been aired. Judges
have been belabored, some with petty questions, some with
weighty problems, only a few of which were directly involved
in the plaintiff's claim. It is more than 100 years since the
4
original Field Code was adopted by the State of New York. 4
It is more than one quarter of a century since the current
Civil Practice Act was adopted. Do we need a revision of
our procedure to make aberrations of this kind impossible,
in the future?

43 130 N.Y.L.J. 893, col. 7 (Ct. of App. Oct. 27, 1953) (306 N.Y. 606, 115
N.E.2d 831).
44See Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS 3 (Reppy ed. 1949).

